Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 44

Issue 2

Article 4

October 1967

Specialists
William J. Joost

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William J. Joost, Specialists , 44 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 114 (1967).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol44/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

decision may not be reached in all cases. There may be a duty to inform
the patient of the consequences of a particular procedure if alternative
procedures are possible, thus allowing the patient to make a choice.39
There may also be a duty to inform the patient if the consequences of the
proposed procedure to be used are substantially certain to occur. 40 Hence,
the duty upon the physician to inform is conditioned on the type of treatment which is necessary, the danger of that treatment and the psychological
stability of the patient.
GERALD J. SMOLLER

SPECIALISTS
The standard of care, in most jurisdictions, has been modified to require a greater degree of skill from specialists than ordinary general practitioners.1 The rationale for imposing this greater duty is that specialists
are sought out and greater confidence is placed in them by patients because
2
of the expertise they profess.
Illinois courts, however, have not changed the ordinary standard of
care3 in dealing with specialists. In Schierson v. Walsh, 4 the defendant-physician had claimed to be one of the greatest and most skillful surgeons in
the world. The plaintiff, through the State Department of Registration and
Education, sought to have the defendant's license revoked. The medical
committee of the Department held the defendant to his assertions of expertise. Thus, his acts of negligence became gross neglect because of the
higher standard of care that was imposed on him. This showing of gross
malpractice met statutory requirements for license revocation.5
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the defendant's
license. The court, in holding that an imposition of a higher standard of
care on the defendant was improper, stated that the test of "reasonable
skill.., such as physicians in good practice ordinarily use and would bring
to a similar case in that locality" was

"...

safe for both public and

profession." 6
39

Cf., Bang v. Charles T Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).

40 See Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317

P.2d 170 (1957).
1 See, e.g., Worster v. Caylor, 231 Ind. 625, 110 N.E.2d 337 (1953); Rayburn v. Day,
126 Or. 135, 286 Pac. 1002 (1928).
2 Baker v. Hancock, 29 Ind. App. 456, 63 N.E. 323 (1902).
3 Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 385 (1860).
4 354 Ill. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1933).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 16a(3), Medical Practice Act (1959 as amended 1961, 1963, and
1965).
The section provides that license revocation can be based on a showing of gross
malpractice or gross negligence. Ordinary negligence, sufficient to establish a prima fade
case of malpractice, would not be adequate.
6 Supra note 4, at 49, 187 N.E. at 927 (1933).

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

IN ILLINOIS

Despite the fact that the above case has never been overruled, the committee drafting the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions formalized the instruction on the basis of the majority rule that requires a higher standard for
the specialist. 7 This is true since the Schierson case involved a license revocation and, therefore, can be distinguished on its facts from a negligence
action. Imposition of a higher standard on specialists, in a license revocation hearing, would cause a negligent act or omission to become gross malpractice, thus providing grounds for revocation. Yet, in a malpractice
damage suit, it is more equitable to hold the specialist to a higher standard,
especially considering increased specialization.
WILLIAM J. JOOST

SCHOOLS OF MEDICINE'
The majority of American courts have held that medical practitioners
2
are entitled to be judged according to their individual schools of medicine.
However, a school of medicine must have certain recognized tenets and be
followed by a respectable minority of the profession.3
Illinois recognizes the existence of different medical schools of thought
in its Medical Practice Act. 4 For example, chiropractors and osteopaths
are entitled to a limited medical practice under the Act.3 However, no discrimination in the administration of the Act is permitted against any
school, system, or method of medical practice.6
Despite legislative recognition of methods of treatment, and the strong
majority opinion to the contrary, the standard of care is the same for
7
anyone practicing medicine in Illinois, no matter what school is followed.
In Bacon v. Walsh, s the court stated that the defendant's case had not been
prejudiced by failure to show what school of medicine he followed. The
7

I.P.I. 105.02 (1961). See p. 108 of this symposium for the instruction generally given.

1 The term "schools of medicine" is used to denote methods or systems of treating
human disease as differentiated from the system of medicine practiced by physicians and
surgeons. It is not intended to include various techniques used by physicians and surgeons
in treating a given ailment.
2 Willet v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Atkinson v.
American School of Osteopathy, 240 Mo. 338, 144 S.W. 816 (1912); Nelson v. Dahl, 174
Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 941 (1928); Cummins v. Donley, 173 Kan. 463, 249 P.2d 695 (1952).
3 Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 (1888).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91, Medical Practice Act (1959 as amended 1961, 1963, and 1965).
5 II. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 9a, Medical Practice Act (1959).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 § 16e, Medical Practice Act (1959).
"The provisions of this Act shall not be so construed as to discriminate against any
system or method of treating human ailments . . ." 1923, June 30, Laws 1923, p. 436, § 20.
7 Bacon v. Walsh, 184 Ill. App. 377 (1913). Similar provisions to those noted supra
notes 5 and 6 were in existence when the case was decided under Medical Practice Act of
1899.
8 Ibid.

